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I. THE VIDEO TAPE PORTRAYING THE PORTION OF THE ROAD PRECEDING THE 
ACCIDENT SCENE WAS IRRELEVANT, INCORRECT, CONFUSING, AND 
PREJUDICIAL AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN EXCLUDED, 
As pointed out in appellee's answer brief, video-taped 
evidence is admissible in the state of Utah. Rule 1001(2) Utah 
Rules of Evidence, (1991). However, the admission of video-taped 
evidence is not unlimited. First, video taped evidence must meet 
the foundation requirements for authentication which is required of 
all evidence. In State v. Purcell, 711 P.2d 243 (Utah 1985), the 
court held that the adequacy of foundation for admissability of 
photographs is not undermined by minor discrepancies in testimony, 
because these went only to details of time and place and were not 
material to the purpose for which the evidence was introduced. 
However, in the case at bar the court admitted a video tape 
which was filmed from a different height than actually viewed by 
the plaintiff, from a different position in the road than that 
driven by the plaintiff (the defendant testified that the plaintiff 
was closer to the inside of his own lane when the accident occurred 
(Deposition Taken of Gary Laney, Dec. 15, 1988, p. 13)), and filmed 
at a different speed than that traveled by the plaintiff (contrary 
to appellee's implied argument that when two vehicles are traveling 
within the speed limit they are therefore traveling at the same 
speed). 
Purcell, clearly allows photographic evidence with 
discrepancies as to authentication when those discrepancies do not 
undermine the very purpose for which the photographic evidence is 
being introduced. However, in the instant case, the defendant 
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introduced this irrelevant video tape to show the type of curve and 
surrounding circumstances as they were at the time of the accident, 
and as viewed by the parties. (Hearing Held Outside the Presence 
of the Jury, Dec, 13, 1991, p. 48 1. 20-25). 
The defendant made it clear what his motives were for 
introducing either of two video tapes when he responded to 
plaintiff's argument against admitting such evidence: 
[I] agree with Mr. Ivie to the extent that no one can say 
what happened other than these two drivers. And Mr. 
Butts has testified that he saw Mr. Laney across the 
center line. Mr. Laney said "I wasn't across the center 
line." And so we have proposed various theories as to 
why Mr. Butts may have seen across the center line. We 
are not saying that's the only theory, but I think we are 
entitled to put on such evidence to say that this is a 
possibility for him seeing across the center line. It's 
not an attempt to say this is the reconstruction. It's 
an attempt to do exactly what we have attempted to do and 
say this is one explanation as to why Mr. Butts thought 
it [defendant] was across the center line. He can give 
all those things in cross examination . . . there was a 
telephoto lens used and all of these different things to 
persuade the jury that what they are seeing isn't 
actually what happened. 
Ibid, at p. 43, 1. 13-25; p. 44, 1. 1-4 (Brackets Added) 
Upon this video evidence the defense built their seemingly 
persuasive argument of an optical illusion theory. The 
discrepancies in the filming of the video materially undermine the 
very reason for which they were admitted, and therefore undermine 
the adequacy of the foundation for the video tape's admissability. 
Rule 902, Utah Rules of evidence (1991). 
Contrary to appellee's contention that the video tape shown to 
the jury contained the actual point where the accident occurred, 
the only section viewed was the preceding roaid. (Hearing Held 
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Outside the Presence of the Jury, Dec. 13, 1991, p. 49; p. 50, 1. 
1-10)• This is relevant to the issue of whether the admission of 
the video tape portraying the preceding road did in fact confuse 
the jury, as to what the surrounding circumstances were where the 
accident occurred. 
Appellee began his argument by discrediting the early, but 
landmark case of Ortiz v. State, 30 Fla. 256, 11 So. 611 (Fla. 
1892) . This case stands for the standard that distorted 
photographic evidence which is misleading and which can be of no 
assistance to the jury in the case, but stands as an agency of 
confusion, should be excluded. In a more recent case the Kansas 
Supreme Court held that M [i]t is only when photographs are 
distorted, indirect, incorrect, or are otherwise unfair, that they 
are objectionable." Ellis v. City Of Kansas City, 589 P.2d 552, 
557,558 (Kan. 1979). These two cases focus on the possibly 
negative effect distorted and incorrect visual images can have on 
a jury when the case itself relies heavily on visual perspective. 
Appellee, in his answer, cites the distinguishable case of 
State v. Brown, 607 P.2d 261 (Utah 1980). Brown, a criminal case, 
has as its central focus the criminal offense of first degree 
murder. Neither the prosecution, nor the defense, purported 
theories that relied on visual perspective. The video tape was 
illustrative of the area around a trailer and truck where the 
victim was chased, repeatedly shot, and buried; this was to show 
where the witnesses, victim, and assailant stood. The case at bar 
is inapposite to Brown, because the defendant purported an 
3 
explanation for why the plaintiff saw and testified that he 
specifically saw the defendant cross over the center dividing line 
into his lane causing him to swerve off the road into some rock 
outcroppings resulting in serious injuries to the plaintiff. This 
explanation was that at the point where the accident occurred, an 
optical illusion was created causing the plaintiff to "see" the 
defendant cross over the center line. 
Contrary to the illustrative evidence admitted in Brown, the 
video tape of the road preceding the accident was used to support 
the defendant's theory, directly undermining Mr. Butts strongest 
evidence; this theory relied directly on visual perspective. 
Defense counsel proposed their theory of an optical illusion and 
also referred to this evidence in closing argument. (Testimony 
Held Outside the Presence of the Jury, February 14, 1991, P. 6; P. 
7, L. 1-21). 
The defendant's own expert testified of the distortion created 
in a video when it is filmed at varying heights and at different 
lateral locations. (Transcript of Trial Held on February 13, 1991, 
p. 41, 1. 6-12) „ This distortion may have misled the jury and 
confused them concerning the probability of an optical illusion. 
Furthermore, the trial court erred in admitting this 
incorrect, and distorted evidence and failing to point out the 
discrepancies between the visual perspective of a person driving a 
motorcycle, viewing the road from the height of the motorcycle, at 
a position in the road where appellant was driving, and at the 
speed driven by the appellant, and the visual perspective portrayed 
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in the video• The Idaho Supreme Court held that such discrepancies 
need to be pointed out to the jury, if such inaccurate evidence is 
to be admitted. The court stated: ,f[i]t is established that the 
use of exhibits by a testifying witness in order to supplement or 
illustrate events is proper insofar as the differences between the 
events depicted and the events observed are explained by the 
witness and the exhibit is not deceptive." Zolber v. Winters, 712 
P. 2d 525 (Idaho 1985). See also Ostler v. Albina Transfer Co. , 
Inc. 781 P.2d 445 (Utah App. 1989). In the case at bar, there was 
no explanation offered by the witness, elicited by counsel, nor 
interjected by the court concerning these material discrepancies. 
This enabled counsel to support their theory of an optical illusion 
and undermine the appellant's case. 
The defendant points out that this tape was created by the 
plaintiff's own expert reconstructionist. The inference is that 
this video, because it was created by plaintiff's expert, cannot be 
confusing, misleading, and prejudicial because the plaintiff 
created it for his own benefit at trial. First, the video was not 
created for the purpose of giving the jury the correct visual 
perspective of the road where the accident occurred, nor to portray 
the type of corner where the accident occurred. It wasn't even 
created for use at trial. Rather, it was created by Mr. Duval for 
his own use. 
Furthermore, defense counsel alludes to plaintiff's expert's 
(Mr. Duval) deposition statement that photographic evidence is 
helpful to the jury. (Appellee's Answer Brief, p. 4, paragraph 2). 
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The appellant concedes this fact, but is compelled to add that 
misleading, distorted, and confusing photographic evidence can do 
more harm than accurate photographic evidence can do good. 
Appellee points out that aerial photographs submitted by the 
plaintiff were admitted as illustrative and were clearly taken at 
different height variations than that experienced by the parties. 
However, appellee fails to acknowledge the distinction between the 
video tape that incorrectly depicted a visual perspective which can 
be construed by the jury as the perspective which the parties 
experienced, and the aerial photographs which in no way can be 
confused to portray such visual perspective. 
Rule 402, of the Utah Rules of Evidence, explicitly precludes 
the admission of irrelevant evidence. Rule 401 defines relevant 
evidence as "evidence having any tendency to make the existence of 
any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action 
more probable or less probable than it would be without the 
evidence." The video tape depicted the preceding road which had 
absolutely no bearing on any fact of consequence to the 
determination of the action. The preceding road did not dictate 
the visual perspective, elevation, angle or existing light at the 
actual corner where the accident took place. It's only effect was 
as an agent of confusion. 
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II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING DEFENSE COUNSEL TO SOLICIT 
EVIDENCE THAT THE PLAINTIFF HAD RECEIVED WORKER1S COMPENSATION 
BENEFITS FOR THE ACCIDENT IN QUESTION. 
In Robinson v. Hreinson, 409 P.2d 121 (Utah 1965), the Supreme 
Court declared that it is the "duty of both counsel and court to 
guard against" the introduction of insurance. The court's use of 
the word duty indicates the important and well-accepted task of 
precluding this damaging evidence. In C. R. Owens Trucking Corp. 
v, Stewart, 509 P.2d 821, 823 (Utah 1973), the Supreme Court 
reemphasized the danger of allowing damaging evidence as to the 
existence of insurance when it stated: "Interjection of insurance 
into trial should be forestalled by counsel and court wherever and 
whenever possible." The court indicates again that great lengths 
should be taken to prevent such damaging evidence from coming 
before the jury. As so eloquently provided by the appellee, the 
court went on to qualify their conviction against introduction of 
such evidence when they stated: "we could not make it anymore 
definite unless we said damn it." 
Appellee mentions that the appellant has used cases from 
foreign jurisdictions to support the argument that injection of 
evidence by the defendant about the plaintiff receiving worker's 
compensation benefits is prejudicial, immaterial, and reversible 
error. This is a case of first impression in the State of Utah and 
although the Supreme Court has dealt with the effect evidence as to 
insurance has at trial, the court has not decided on what effect 
evidence as to already received worker's compensation benefits has 
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at trial. To resolve this legal issue of first impression, we must 
look to sister jurisdictions for assistance. 
Appellee concedes the fact that at side bar the defense and 
the court were warned that plaintiff's line of questioning would 
lead to evidence concerning worker's compensation benefits. This 
objection is preserved in the record later when the jury was 
recessed. Counsel for the plaintiff stated: 
The basis for my objection was that there was a 
collateral source for this accident. As Mr. Butts was 
required to testify, he wasn't working at the time that 
claim was made, he suffered a fall that Dr. Gaufin felt 
was related directly to the motorcycle accident . . that 
it's now in has allowed the jury to know there is a 
collateral source, they may therefore feel that Mr. Butts 
doesn't require compensation, that he would be given 
double compensation for such things as medical bills and 
lost wages. 
Proceedings Held Outside the Presence of the Jury on February 12, 
1991, p. 8, 1. 16-25; p. 9, 1. 1-4). 
The fact that there was ample warning concerning the 
introduction of this damaging evidence, that neither defense 
counsel nor the court saw fit to prevent its prejudicial 
introduction, warrants a new opportunity for the plaintiff to have 
his claim determined free from such material prejudice. 
Furthermore, appellee points out that common sense dictates 
that defense counsel wouldn't want to reveal evidence concerning 
subsequent injuries related to the accident in question, but this 
ignores the greater benefit to the defense's case of informing the 
jury that the plaintiff has already received worker's compensation 
benefits for his injuries and is seeking further compensation. 
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The record reflects that defense counsel made absolutely no 
attempt to stop this testimony when it was apparent that the 
explanation was moving closer and closer and eventually touched on 
the benefits received from worker's compensation claims from the 
disputed accident. Counsel then d: w attention to this evidence as 
to received worker's compensation benefits by requesting the court 
to make sure the record reflect that this explanation was a 
voluntary response after a pause in the defense's line of 
questioning. (Transcript of Cross Examination of Plaintiff, 
Douglas E. Butts, p. 16, 1. 8-11). This is nothing more than the 
result of an intentional line of questioning meant to reveal the 
evidence as to received worker's compensation benefits from the 
1987 Accident. (Ibid, at p. 15, 1. 10-25, p. 16, 1. 1-11) 
Appellee cites the case of C.R. Owens Trucking Corp. v. 
Stewart, 509 P.2d 821, 823 (Utah 1973), as precedent for the 
proposition that the mere mention of insurance does not in all 
cases lead to the conclusion that the jury was prejudiced, but if 
this excerpt from the case is to be used the case must be looked at 
as a whole. In Stewart, the plaintiff's witness mentioned the 
existence of insurance, but the allusions came from completely 
unrelated questioning. In the instant case, the plaintiff was 
asked "and did you make a claim, an Industrial Workman's 
Compensation?" (Transcript of Cross Examination of Plaintiff, 
Douglas E. Butts, p. 15, 1. 13,14). Subsequent to a side bar 
conference, where plaintiff's counsel and the court were warned 
concerning the fear of revelation of worker's compensation 
9 
benefits, which would indicate the plaintiff was covered under 
worker's compensation when working for Ray Butt's Construction Co. , 
the defendant continued the same line of questioning. 
Defense counsel's continued pressing of the question as to 
whether plaintiff had made a worker's compensation claim in 
February of 1989, left the plaintiff on the horns of a dilemma. On 
the one hand, the plaintiff could not deny having made such a claim 
because he was under oath and the fact that he had made such a 
claim was the literal truth. However, to let the matter go at that 
would create a clear inference that he had returned to work in 
February of 1989. Such an inference would strongly impeach the 
truthfulness of his testimony and the testimony of his expert 
medical witnesses regarding the severity of his injuries and 
ultimately the legitimate value of his claim for damages. 
The other horn is that the plaintiff had only one other 
possible response to defense counsel's line of questioning, and 
that was to qualify his answer by stating, as the plaintiff did, 
that the fall precipitating the 1989 medical treatment was a result 
of the 1987 motor vehicle accident and subsequent disabilities. As 
he was receiving worker's compensation for th€> 1987 incident, he 
was entitled to submit a claim for medical treatment for accidents 
caused by physical impairments from this incident; the 1989 fall 
was such an accident. It is imperative to note that the reasonable 
explanation for the 1989 worker's compensation claim was proffered 
at side bar outside the hearing of the jury. (Proceedings Held 
Outside the Presence of the Jury on February 12, 1991, p. 8, 1. 16-
10 
25; p. 9, 1. 1-4). The fact that the plaintiff, Douglas Butts, 
could not have returned to work in 1989 due to the severity of his 
injuries and gross physical impairment was really beyond question 
as pointed out in appellant's original brief. Appellee's 
contention that interjection of the 1989 worker's compensation 
claim is legitimate impeachment regarding Mr. Butt's ability to 
work becomes ludicrous when compared with the severity of his 
injuries and the fact that a reasonable explanation was tendered at 
side bar. 
Nevertheless, defense counsel, over the objection of the 
plaintiff, pressed the issue while the plaintiff was on the stand 
under cross examination. Thus, forcing the plaintiff to choose 
what he felt to be the lesser horn of the dilemma posed to him, and 
give an honest answer which necessarily interjected the issue of 
worker's compensation benefits. 
In Stewart, the revelation of such evidence was clearly 
unintentional, and the court also instructed the jury to disregard 
the statements concerning insurance. The Supreme Court of Utah 
stated in Stewart, that the instruction by the judge to the jury to 
disregard the inadvertent mention of insurance was sufficient to 
cure the matter. Ibid, at 823. In the present case there was no 
such instruction by the court, only the blatant admission of 
evidence concerning worker's compensation with the qualification 
that there was to be no mention of amount. 
Whether an amount is mentioned concerning the already received 
benefits is immaterial, because the introduction of such benefits 
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only leaves the jury with the task of creatively filling in the 
blank• This blank check standard of determining whether such 
evidence is prejudicial, arguably allows in more damaging testimony 
with open ended implications than introduction of the limited 
amount of benefits that actually are received under worker's 
compensation. The standard, as is adopted in many other states, is 
strict prohibition of evidence as to received worker's compensation 
benefits; this avoids the prejudice. 
Interjection of worker's compensation benefits is most 
prejudicial in cases such as the instant case, where the issue of 
liability is hotly disputed. In this case, the plaintiff claimed 
the defendant crossed over the center line forcing the plaintiff 
off the road. Such allegations were firmly denied by the defendant 
and the jury was left to decide whom to believe based on 
circumstantial evidence; this evidence was raised by each 
respective party in its own favor. In the end, the jury was left 
with a difficult decision as to whether the plciintiff had met his 
burden of proof in showing the defendant's negligence. It is 
indeed probable that the scales in this case were tipped in favor 
of the defendant by the jury's knowledge of the plaintiff already 
receiving benefits under worker's compensation. The jury could 
therefore afford to err in favor of the defendant on the difficult 
liability issues. 
Additionally, appellee's contention that admission of 
prejudicial evidence is moot because plaintiff's counsel stipulated 
to certain medical records which contain references to worker's 
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compensation claims, is in err. Appellant initially concedes that 
they stipulated to the admissability of voluminous medical records, 
and appellant would not be surprised that such records contained 
references to worker's compensation. However, the purpose of this 
stipulation was to prevent parties from having to call a multitude 
of record keepers to establish foundation to then admit these 
records at trial. Neither plaintiff nor defendant offered any 
other records which interjected the issue of worker's compensation. 
Had defendant offered any medical records or other documentation 
containing references to worker's compensation, plaintiff would 
have objected and would have raised the same issue which was raised 
at trial and is now raised on appeal regarding the interjection of 
worker's compensation benefits. 
Furthermore, had such records been offered, the plaintiff 
would have had the chance to point out to the trial court that the 
stipulation was not intended to allow admission of any record, 
regardless of it's otherwise inadmissable content, at the whim of 
either party, but that it was merely a stipulation intended to 
resolve foundational issues and expedite the trial. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING EVIDENCE OF CONDUCT 
INDICATING AN ADMISSION OF LIABILITY. 
In Reid v. Owens. 93 P.2d 680 (Utah 1939), the Utah Supreme 
Court established the rule that evidence as to liability insurance 
is admissible when such evidence is intertwined with evidence of an 
admission of liability. In this case there was a verbal admission, 
however, the court did not define whether such an admission is 
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limited to verbal admissions or whether conduct indicating an 
admission of liability may also qualify. 
The main concern behind allowing in evidence as to insurance 
is that the jury will base their decision on whether there is a 
source from which damages may be awarded (a deep pocket), rather 
than basing their decision on the evidence before them. The 
competing, overriding interest expressed in Re id is that an 
admission of liability is vital to the determination of whether the 
defendant did in fact cause the accident and admitted to being the 
cause through an acceptance of liability. In the case at bar, the 
evidence indicates that the defendant's conduct gives rise to a 
question of fact as to whether his actions subsequent to the 
accident show that he in fact believed he was responsible for the 
at-fault accident in which the plaintiff was seriously injured. 
First, the defendant changed his motor vehicle insurance 
company in mid-policy three weeks after the accident. (Testimony 
Held Outside the Presence of the Jury, February 14, 1991, P. 2, L. 
24, 25; P. 3, L. 1). Appellee argues that this switch was solely 
due to the defendant getting a lower premium, however, this motive 
becomes very questionable in light of the relevant evidence. 
Secondly, to compound the spurious nature of this action, the 
defendant sought to conceal his prompt switching, rather than 
instead justifying it by claiming a benign motive. The defendant 
misinformed the plaintiff that he had switched his insurance 
companies several months after the accident. This occurred while 
being deposed on December 15, 1988, 18 months after the June 17, 
14 
1987 accident. The defendant testified under oath in the following 
manner• 
Q: Do you remember how many days after the accident you 
dropped Allstate insurance and purchased a policy through 
a different company? 
A: Sure. It was several Months. 
Deposition of Defendant Gary Laney, taken on Dec. 15, 1988, (p. 26, 
1. 12-16). 
It is apparent from this testimony that the defendant had no 
problem remembering the incorrect time that had elapsed, and when 
giv£n further opportunity to recant or correct his testimony he 
reconfirmed the incorrect answer. (Ibid, at p. 26, 1. 18, 19). 
Froia the defendant's testimony, it: appears that he had no 
difficulty remembering exactly how long it \*as between the accident 
and his mid-policy switching of insurance companies. During Cross 
examination, the defendant recanted and stated that he in fact had 
switched insurance companies only three weeks after the accident. 
(Hearing held Outside the Presence of the Jury, Feb. 14, 1991, p. 
4, 1. 23-25; p. 5, 1. 1-15). 
Further, during cross examination the defendant testified that 
he ^witched insurance companies to get a lower premium. It was 
pointed out at trial that although the defendant did get a lower 
premium, that this was only due to incorrect information given to 
the new insurance company, and had he given correct information 
concerning prior accidents or moving violations, he would have 
received no such decrease in premiums. (Ibid, at p. 24; p. 25, 1. 
1-5/ p. 27; p. 28, 1. 1-11). 
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Dale Knapp, the Allstate insurance agent who sold their policy 
and was experienced with the State Farm and other competing 
policies, testified that the standard facility policy (that 
company's policy which was comparable to the policy sold by State 
Farm to the defendant) was competitive and in fact lower than the 
State Farm policy acquired in December of 1988 by the defendant. 
(Ibid at, p. 18, 1. 21-25; p. 19, 1. 1) 
Furthermore, the defendant had received a reevaluation from 
Allstate and had, as testified to by Mr. Knapp, not been allowed to 
move to the standard policy, but due to his driving record remained 
in the higher risk policy. (Ibid at, p. 23, 1. 4-11; p. 24, 1. 17-
25; p. 25; p. 27, 1. 20-25; p. 28). It was also revealed that 
records showing prior at-fault accidents would not have been 
available to a Utah insurance company who then insured the 
defendant, and the evidence appears to confirm, that this was not 
discovered by State Farm. (Ibid at, pp. 29, 30). 
Further supporting evidence that the defendant's conduct 
indicates his belief that he was responsible for an at-fault 
accident, is his calling the hospital the day after the accident to 
"see if he [plaintiff] was there and how he was doing." 
(Deposition of Gary Laney, Defendant, Dec. 15, 1988, p. 25, 1. 17-
19). 
Taken in the aggregate, the defendant's actions in switching 
liability insurance in mid-policy and three weeks after the 
accident, and not only denying it under oath, but also grossly 
exaggerating the time frame, raise a clear inference of his belief 
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or awareness of his culpability for the motor vehicle accident. 
Appellee1s continued assertion that his conduct is explained simply 
because he received a better premium is inadequate in light of the 
fact that he went from a high risk coverage to a low risk coverage. 
The very fact that he did achieve a better underwriter status is 
further evidence that the policy change was made knowing that he 
was culpable in a serious motor vehicle accident, and that once the 
facts came to light he would no longer be eligible for his desired 
lower risk category of insurance, and would probably be canceled 
altogether. 
This case is deficient any witnesses to either confirm or deny 
the contradictory testimony of the parties, and there was not 
enough evidence from reconstructionists to verify either parties' 
contentions. Under these circumstances it is crucial that evidence 
concerning conduct of the defendant which indicates his belief that 
he was the cause of the plaintiff's injuries, be admitted. 
The probative value of this evidence, creating a strong 
question of fact for the jury to decide, outweighs the possible 
prejudice to the defendant. This is not an immaterial fact used 
merely to bring in evidence as to a collateral source, but a 
material fact which goes directly to prove the cause of action. 
Not withstanding the general rule against the 
introduction of evidence suggesting or implying that the 
defendant is protected by liability insurance, the 
suggestion of the possession of insurance will not be 
avoided at the cost of suppressing evidence material to 
the establishment of a cause of action and the liability 
17 
of a defendant sued for damages, or to show bias or 
prejudice of a witness. 
Annat., Admissabilitv of evidence, and propriety and effect of 
questions, comments, etc. tending to show that defendant in 
personal injury or death action carries liability insurance, 4 
A.L.R. 2d 761 (1949) (Emphasis added). 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant was prejudiced both as to liability and damages by 
the admission of distorted and misleading video-taped evidence; by 
allowing defense counsel to pursue a damaging line of questioning 
which led to the introduction of evidence of the plaintiff's 
receipt of worker's compensation benefits, when defense counsel and 
the court were forewarned of the probable testimony and likely 
prejudice that would, and in fact did, result; and by disallowing 
•the plaintiff the opportunity to put evidence before the jury 
concerning the defendant's culpable conduct indicating his 
acknowledgement of liability for the serious injuries to the 
plaintiff. For the above reasons, severally and cumulatively, the 
appellant was prejudiced, the trial court erred, and a new trial 
should be granted. 
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Rule 401. Definition of "relevant evidence/9 
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to ™nlrp the exis-
tence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more 
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. 
Advisory Committee Note. — Thii rale la 
the federal rale, verbatim, and ii comparable 
in substance to Role 1(2), Utah Rules of Evi-
dence (1971), but the former rale defined rele-
vant evidence aa that having a tendency to 
ANALYSIS 
Effect of remoteness. 
Cited. 
Effect of remoteness* 
Remoteneea usually goat to the weight of the 
evidence and not its admissibility. Terry v. 
Zioni Coop. Mercantile Inst, 606 ?M 314 
(Utah 1979), overruled on other grounds, 
McFariand v. Skaggs Companies, Inc^ 678 
PJ2d 298 (Utah 1984). 
Utah Law Review. — Utah Rules of Evi-
dence 1983, 1985 Utah L. Rev. 63, 78. 
United States v. Downing: Novel Scientific 
prove or disprove the existence of any "mate-
rial fact," Avoiding the use of the term "mate-
rial fact" accords with the fppifrati'?'" given to 
fanner Rule 1(2) by the Utah Supreme Court 
State v. Peterson, 560 P.2d 1387 (Utah 1977). 
Cited in State v. Gray, 717 P.2d 1313 (Utah 
1986); State v. Nicklee, 728 P.2d 123 (Utah 
1986>, Meyers v. Salt Lake City Corp^ 747 
P.2d 1058 (Utah Ct App, 1988); Fisher ex reL 
Fisher v. Trapp, 748 P.2d 204 (Utah Ct App. 
1988): Belden v. Oalbo, In*, 752 P.2d 1317 
(Utah Ct App. 1988); State v. Worthen, 766 
?M 839 (Utah 1988); State v. Maurer, HO 
PJ2d981 (Utah 1989); State, In re RJ) A , 777 
P.2d 532 (Utah Ct App. 1989); Whitehead v. 
American Motors Sales Corp^ 801 P.2d 920 
(Utah 1990). 
Evidence and the Rejection of Fire, 1986 Utah 
Lfiev. 839. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Rule 402. Relevant evidence generally admissible; irrele-
vant evidence inadmissible. 
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the 
Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the state of Utah, 
statute, or by these rules, or by other rules applicable in courts of this state. 
Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible. 
Advisory Committee Note. — The text of Compiler's Notes. — 11M Utah rule alio 
thia role u Rale 402, Uniform Rules of Evi- add* the words "or the Constitution of the state 
deuce (1974) except that prior to the word of Utah" to Rule 402, Uniform Rules of Evi-
"statute" the words "Constitution of the United ^ (1974) 
States" have been added. 
Rule 902. Self-authentication. 
i s S f ^ u i ^ 
* i i ) D°UStic.v^al 1 ° ^ ^ a m i e r ^ ^ A document bearing a 
seal purporting to be that of the United States, or tfM?S£Efct. 
commonwealth, territory, or insular possession t w J u T \ 1 A ! P I ™ O 
Ca^ai Zone, or . h ^ Territory of ffi"Kc&£ J ? , $ S 
porting to be an attestation or execution. ^ ^ 
«; Domestic puttie documents not nnw^o^i
 A J 
porting to b«r tkTSgnatnr. in h u f o n S ^ S T t f t . ' ^ ^ Z ' 
ployee of any entity included in Paraeranhnn™-! 7 ™ ^ ^ *T ? ' 
P«bUc officer K g . ^  S i S S S ^ O ^ S ^ S ^ A / l 
foreign official whose certificate o f r e n n i n e ^ S K ^ L ? ®i £ • ? * 
Action or K ^ K E ^ ; . ^ ? * " * - « * 
without final certification. UBUKWI °J ™ attested summary with or 
r ^ n a « t h o r i z e d t o n S S e ^ e S f £ d d c ^ 5 ^ «Btodian or other 
n e w ^ a p ^ o r ^ c 1 r i 0 d l C ^ ^ ^ ' ^ t ^ P-porting to be 
ing o ^ n ^ ^ ^ o r S ^ m ^ « ™ * business « * indicat-
- ^ a S S g n ^ ^ ^ ^ L ^ a c ^ p a j i e d ^ a certifi. 
notary public or ^ SStSSSS^S^LT'T. ^ ^ * U w * a 
(9) C o n i m e r r i a l n a w ^ f d ™ f ^ ^ b y , U > t t e acknowledgments. 
signatures t h ^ , P a K S u l f S f ^ documents. Commercial paper, 
vided by general 
commercial law ^ ^ thereto to the extent pro-
tne constitution of this state. " "" °" I"""*^ i= 
^"SSStoSSlSl*uJL'IS^ R?'bd!^r ( 1 0 ) fa ^ ^ *»*«». U«ifcm Evidence (1971) ^ t a - rf Balm rf Erohnw (1974). ^ ^ 
ARTICLE X. 
CONTENTS OF WRITINGS, RECORDINGS, 
AND PHOTOGRAPHS. 
Rule 1001. Definitions. 
For Purposes of this article the following definitions are applicable: 
I«£L S 2 8 " ™d TOTdhlg^ " W r i ^ ^ and "recordu^" consist of 
S S S r i S ? " °r T*"? °r t h d r e « o i ' » t a * • * downbytuindwriting, 
^pewnting, printing, photostating, photographing, magnetic impulse 
mechanical or electrenic recording, or other fornfof^£^S 
fik?, ^ ! ? f a p h S - J^F*^" delude -ill photographsP X ra* films, video tapes, and motion pictures. y 
j S L S f 1 ^ *" "^S^" o f a *»**»* °r recording is the writing or 
recording itself or any counterpart intended to havelhe same effect by a 
person executing or issuing it. An "original" of a photograph includes the 
negatave or any print therefrom. If data are stored ina computern 
J ^ I S T X . " * 7 P n ^ U t ? °theJ °UtpUt r e a d a b l e fay * t , shown to reuect tne data accurately, is an original" 
(4) Duplicate. A "duplicate" is a counterpart produced by the same 
J O S T P y' m c l u d m S enlargements and miniatures, or by mechanical 
« L n r £ ° r » « » * » « » o r by f inical reproduction, or by other equiv-
alent techmques which accurately reproduce the original. 
* ^ S r 2 £ ^ 3 ^ * ^ ^ ^ " ^ U U h R u l e - o f E v i d e n c e 
writing" in subdivision (1) comsponda in sub-
